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Abstract— Fog-to-cloud systems have emerged as a novel 
concept intended to improve service performance by considering 
fog and cloud resources in a coordinated way. In such a 
heterogeneous scenario, security provisioning becomes necessary, 
hence novel security solutions must be designed to handle the 
highly distributed fog-to-cloud nature. In the security area, key 
distribution and authentication are referred to as two critical 
pillars for a successful security deployment. Unfortunately, 
traditional centralized key distribution and authentication 
approaches do not meet the particularities brought by a Fog-to-
cloud system due to its distributed nature. In this paper, we 
propose a novel distributed key management and authentication 
(DKMA) strategy to make Fog-to-cloud systems as secure as 
possible. The paper ends up presenting some results assessing the 
benefits of the proposed strategy in terms of traffic and delay 
reduction.  
Keywords— IoT, cloud computing, fog computing, fog-to-cloud 
computing, security, key distribution and authentication 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Nowadays, the deployment of edge devices, from sensors 
and actuators to smart phones and laptops, is increasing day by 
day worldwide. When these devices embed connectivity and 
some sort of smart capacities, the whole scenario is referred to 
as the Internet of Things (IoT). A key benefit brought by IoT is 
its capacity to develop novel services leveraging wide 
communication as well as high data collection and processing 
capacities. The envisioned requirement in high data collection 
capacity enforces IoT to rely on cloud computing to guarantee 
a proper data processing –also storage if needed. Cloud 
computing [1] facilitates an on-demand access to a shared pool 
of resources, to enable high processing or large storage 
capacities. However, cloud computing may not be the proper 
paradigm for services requiring highly constrained demands in 
terms of, for example, latency for dependable e-health services 
or immediate decision making processes in industry. Thus, IoT 
services may look for proximate resources to support services 
requiring such a specific constraint. To that end, fog computing 
[2] was proposed to provide real-time processing, low-latency, 
storage and decision making close to the users demanding the 
service. Undoubtedly, fog does not come to replace cloud 
computing, rather fog and cloud must cooperate and thus work 
under a coordinated umbrella to improve IoT services 
performance. Aligned to this coordinated scenario, two 
research trends have recently come up, Fog-to-cloud (F2C) [3] 
and the OpenFog Reference Architecture (OFRA) [4], both 
proposing a solution intended to coordinate the resources 
continuum, from fog to cloud, in a coordinated way. Be it F2C 
or OFRA, one of the main concerns in this coordinated 
scenario is the security. This paper deals with security issues in 
the highly attractive scenario built by considering a joint 
fog/cloud resources system, such as F2C or OFRA. Hereafter, 
and for the sake of scenario illustration, we will focus on F2C 
to represent such a combined resources system. 
Related to the security area, key distribution and 
authentication are preliminary approaches to provide secure 
communication and integrity in a system. However, traditional 
cloud keys distribution and authentication, or even the use of 
one public key generator (PKG), are not foreseen as proper 
approaches to be applied to a F2C system, mixing up the 
traditional cloud along with a set of heterogeneous and 
dynamic fog resources. Indeed, although cloud computing is 
per se a distributed system (different instances can be allocated 
to run a service in a transparent, scalable, open and reliable 
way), in this paper we consider cloud as a centralized approach 
when compared to fog computing. Thus, hereon we will refer 
to centralized and distributed approaches when considering 
traditional cloud or F2C approaches respectively. 
Although security is a common and mandatory requirement 
in general IoT systems, some scenarios relying on IoT devices 
are extremely sensitive to security concerns. Particularly, we 
want to explicitly highlight the impact security provisioning 
may have on a critical infrastructure (CI) system, nowadays 
enriched with several IoT devices, that while bringing new 
capacities and features, they also make the system more 
vulnerable. Nowadays, CI systems are ever relying on many 
different and heterogeneous IoT devices intended to sensor, 
detect, monitor and also immediately actuate on the 
infrastructure (see [5], [6] and [7] for detailed information in 
this domain). Thus, the specific security weaknesses inherent to 
IoT devices integrated into CI systems drive several open 
challenges –key management, key distribution and 
authentication delay time, network overhead, latency and 
scalability– that must be carefully addressed.  
Some contributions have been already proposed for key 
distribution and authentication in fog computing, later 
reviewed in this paper to learn from the existing literature, 
although these approaches do not consider the coordinated 
cloud and fog scenario. One of the first attempts to address the 
key distribution and authentication in a coordinated F2C 
scenario was proposed in [8], where a new security architecture 
leveraging a centralized controller in cloud and distributed 
controllers in different areas has been proposed. In this paper, 
we propose a distributed key management and authentication 
(DKMA) workflow to be applied to the architecture in [8], 
aiming to illustrate that the security architecture proposed in [8] 
(using distributed controllers) for key distribution and 
authentication is much more efficient than a centralized one 
(cloud) in terms of: i) traffic to the cloud; ii) time spent by the 
key distribution and authentication processing; iii) network 
delay and, finally; iv) network overhead. For comparison 
purposes and in order to illustrate the differences in efficiency 
assuming the same security quality, we keep the same key 
distribution and authentication strategy, namely elliptic curve 
digital signature algorithm, for both scenarios (cloud 
centralized, and the proposed distributed controllers). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
related work; section 3 describes the whole scenario, including 
the security architecture, the concept of elliptic curve signature 
cryptography and several tentative approaches for allocating 
the set of distributed controllers. Then, section 4 presents the 
proposed DKAM workflow that is evaluated in section 5. 
Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several works have been proposed for key distribution and 
authentication in the cloud arena, hence in a centralized way 
and thus with no direct applicability to the distributed F2C 
scenario. However, we revisit such contributions to learn on 
past efforts. 
Authors in [9] propose an identity authentication-based data 
access control, where key distribution, mutual authentication, 
and access control are all managed by an authorized agency. 
This proposal relies on a centralized authorized agency, thus if 
the authorized agency is compromised, the whole system 
would be compromised as well (i.e., single point of failure). 
Similarly, in [10], authors propose an identity-based 
signcryption scheme with efficient revocation access control 
for big data, leveraging a centralized PKG for key distribution 
between users and the analytical system. In [11], authors 
propose an identity based signcryption scheme with proxy re-
encryption access control, also relying on a centralized PKG 
between users and cloud. Authors in [12], propose to use a 
trusted third-party system between users, data owners and 
cloud storage to distribute keys, handle encryption and 
decryption, as well as authentication. The proposal uses a 
centralized trusted authority (TA) between cloud and users; 
hence any compromise in the centralized TA can affect the 
whole system. In [13], authors propose to use a centralized 
cryptographic server (CS) aimed at providing each data-file 
with symmetric keys. The CS provides integrity, 
confidentiality, access control, and data sharing to the users. 
Unfortunately, as a centralized approach, it also becomes a 
single point of failure.  
Despite the fact that all reviewed proposals dealing with 
cloud security can certainly use cloud replication (see for 
example [14], [15], 16] and [17]), some security issues remain 
unsolved, such as the latency of the system when using cloud, 
the complexity added by handling key management for 
thousands of devices, the huge number of messages forwarded 
to the cloud, or the increased network delay. 
On the other hand, there are some proposals dealing with 
key distribution and authentication specially oriented to fog 
computing. These proposals suggest the use of either a 
centralized public key generator (PKG) or distributed servers to 
generate keys (usually these servers carry out many different 
tasks and cannot be so effective to be used as key generators). 
A review of security proposals in the fog related arena is 
provided next. 
The work in [18] proposes mutual authentication for edge 
devices, fog and cloud, leveraging a registration authority (RA) 
located at cloud and already authenticated to the fog servers. 
Then, the fog servers chose a unique ID (identity) signed with 
the RA signature and sent to the users. In parallel, when fog 
users register to the cloud, the RA sends a long-lived random 
master secret key to the fog users, so that fog users and fog 
servers can authenticate themselves. The main weakness of this 
proposal is twofold. First, it relies on a RA centralized at cloud, 
thus, if the centralized RA is compromised, the whole system 
can be compromised as well. Second, it uses long-term keys 
that would not be updated or revoked. Authors in [19] propose 
a key exchange protocol based on policy-attribute encryption to 
provide confidentiality, authentication and access control to fog 
servers. In their architecture, a centralized key generator server 
is responsible for distributing keys to all entities, while cloud is 
responsible for defining access control policies. Again, the 
whole system can be compromised if the centralized key 
generator server is compromised. In [20], authors propose first 
to group users, and then a cloud service provider generates 
keys for these groups. In this architecture, IoT nodes can act as 
both, clients and servers to generate keys and to establish 
mutual authentication and secure communication between 
different user groups. In this proposal, the fact that an IoT node 
can act as client, server, and also can generate keys, facilitates 
a potential attacker to act as a server, hence establishing 
communication with a node in the group and thus 
compromising the whole group. 
According to both the literature review and the envisioned 
F2C scenario, we argue that a new strategy for key distribution 
and authentication among fogs and between cloud and fogs is 
required in F2C systems, due to its distributed nature. We also 
argue that our proposal, based on a centralized controller in 
cloud and a set of distributed controllers in different fog areas, 
can be more efficient (in terms of messages forwarded to 
cloud, time required for key distribution and authentication, 
network delay and network overhead), than existing centralized 
proposals. Moreover, an additional advantage brought in by our 
proposal, refers to its distributed nature. Indeed, by using the 
distributed control approach for key distribution and 
authentication, an undesired problem on a single controller will 
not compromise the whole system –the centralized F2C 
controller can revoke the compromised controller and later 
inform the other. Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the 
level of security can, even, be increased by using hybrid key 
distributions and authentication mechanisms for the different 
layers (cloud and fog). In fact, this is posed as the next step in 
the proposed architecture. 
III. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
A. The security architecture 
In [8] we introduced for the first time a decoupled architecture 
intended to provide security to a F2C system, as briefly 
depicted in Figure 1. In short, the proposed architecture 
includes a centralized F2C controller located at cloud and 
several distributed control-area-units (CAU) located at distinct 
fog areas (areas definition is out of the scope of this paper, see 
[21] for details). The CAUs would be registered, authenticated 
and authorized during the F2C initialization phase from a F2C 
controller located at cloud, thus guaranteeing security in their 
corresponding areas. It is worth highlighting the fact that a 
CAU is only responsible for providing security in the devices 
located within its area. This security architecture brings some 
remarkable advantages, such as: 
• Decreasing the number of messages going to cloud. 
• Enhancing privacy and security. 
• Providing secure mobility due to the CAUs 
intercommunication –any attack or failure in CAUs 
would not affect the whole system because it would 
be detected and revoked by the F2C controller. 
• Key management scalability 
• One centralized key generator for CAUs and 
distributed key generator for providing device’s keys 
in two levels can facilitate authentication. 
• Using distributed controllers to improve efficiency in 
terms of network overhead and energy. 
Be able to use hybrid and different key distribution 
and encryption at different levels. 
• Reducing the entire delay in the system. 
• Facilitating key management by using distributed 
CAUs, so as each device’s public keys are not stored 




Fig. 1. Proposed security architecture 
B. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
This paper is aimed at comparing the proposed distributed 
controllers approach vs a traditional cloud centralized 
approach, in terms of key distribution and authentication 
delay, and network overhead. To that end, we propose to use 
elliptic curve key distribution and signature for managing keys 
and authentication. A key Elliptic Curve Criptography (ECC) 
advantage is that it provides same security guarantees as 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and other cryptographies with 
less key size. In this section we briefly review this concept. 
Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) is known 
to be an efficient secure certificate-signing algorithm, used in 
several TLS libraries, such as OpenSSL and GnuTLS. ECDSA 
depends on modular arithmetic operations on elliptic curves as 
defined by the equation (1) 
                             y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b mod p                           (1) 
The curve includes three parameters: p, a large prime defining 
the curve finite field Fp, and the coefficients, a and b [22, 23].  
Figure 2 lists all parameters description as used in the 
algorithm. 
 
Fig. 2. ECDSA Algorithm sign description 
The ECDSA algorithm features the two following 
functionalities: 
1. Key generation: It is based on elliptic curve diffie-hellman, 
which is used for encryption and decryption.  
1.1. The private key sk is a random integer chosen 
from {1,…,p−1}  
1.2. Public key pk is calculated from the curve point 
multiplication pk = sk × G. 
2. Signature and verifying: Used for authentication. 
2.1 Signing:  
• Take a random integer k chosen from range 
of {1,…,p−1} 
• A curve point is calculated by: (u,v) = k × G. 
• One part of signature is r = u mod n.  
• If r=0, then choose another k and try again. 
• The other part of signature is s = k −1 (z + rd) mod n. 
• If s=0, then choose another k and try again. 
• The pair (r,s) is the signature. 
2.2 Verifying: The signer's public key pk, the (truncated) 
hash z and, obviously, the signature (r,s) are required. 
• Calculate the integer u1 = s−1z mod n. 
• Calculate the integer u2 = s−1r mod n. 
• Calculate the point P = u1G + u2 pk. 
The signature is valid only if r = u mod n. 
C. Security Architecture Approaches 
In this section, we introduce and analyze different 
approaches for deploying CAUs along the F2C architecture. 
Four options are considered, as described next. 
• In Figure 3a, we represent the centralized case, where a 
centralized cloud is responsible for providing security for 
the whole F2C system. This scheme has some 
disadvantages, such as: i) the high amount of messages 
forwarded to cloud; ii) the higher the number of devices 
the higher the delay; iii) the high network overhead and 
energy consumption due to the centralized cloud 
architecture; iv) any compromise or attack in cloud can 
compromise the whole system.  
• A centralized CAU (between cloud and the edge, i.e., 
closer to users) can be used to provide security for the 
F2C system (Figure 3b). This approach inherits some of 
the weaknesses from case 1, such as the centralized view 
that may put the whole system at risk, when the 
centralized CAU is attacked. 
• Figure 3c implements the scenario where each individual 
CAU provides security for a single device in the system. 
This architecture is not desirable mainly for scalability 
issues. 
• Figure 3d extends the scenario presented in Figure 3c by 
considering each CAU to be attached to several devices 
at the edge (theoretically within its area). This can be a 
much more elaborated option to provide security in a 
F2C system, although certainly bringing several open 
issues and challenges, such as how many CAUs may 
control the system, how many devices can be controlled 
by a CAU, etc.   
From the four presented architectures, Figure 3d seems to be 
the most appropriate one, since different CAUs are 
responsible for providing security to their corresponding 
areas. However, extensive evaluations are required to 
converge on a solid assessment for a single architecture. 
Moreover, whatever the selected architecture will be, many 
challenges are certainly demanding further research efforts.  
 
 
            Fig. 3. Different security architecture approaches 
IV. THE DKMA PROPOSAL 
In this section, we propose a distributed key management and 
authentication (DKMA) workflow, leveraging the security 
architecture described in section 3.A. Thus, the main rationale 
for this paper is twofold. First, to present the DKMA workflow 
and, second, to show how the deployment of the proposed 
DKMA in the security architecture briefly summarized in 
section 3.A increases the efficiency of the key management and 
authentication processes, in terms of the traffic to cloud, the 
time demanded by the key distribution and authentication 
processing, the network delay and the network overhead. 
The proposed DKMA assumes CAUs are deployed matching 
the distributed architecture shown in Figure 3d. The DKMA 
process assumes one centralized F2C controller and several 
distributed CAUs. Let’s also consider all CAUs will be 
authenticated and will get keys to provide secure 
communication to each other but also to the F2C controller. 
Then all CAUs will also get the authorization from the F2C 
controller to provide keys and authenticate devices within their 
areas. 
Finally, we assume all devices to be “registered” in a previous 
registration process, where devices are assigned to a unique 
“ID”. This ID is used to uniquely identify all devices thus 
preventing a potential attacker to fake itself.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Distributed key management and authentication 
 
Fig. 5. Distributed key management and authentication workflow 
The entire process for the DKMA workflow is shown in Figure 
4 and Figure 5 and described next into two main steps: 
Step1 (Initialization phase):  Control-area unit’s (CAU) key 
distributions and authentication. 
1 In the initialization phase of the system, all CAUs get 
keys and signature from the F2C controller at cloud.  
2 The F2C controller authenticates CAUs and provides 
secure CAUs inter-communication. Therefore, CAUs 
take the authorization of the F2C controller to generate 
and provide keys and signature for the devices deployed 
within their areas. 
Step2 (Authentication): All distributed CAUs use the elliptic 
curve signature based key and signature algorithm to provide 
keys and authenticate their corresponding devices.  
1. Each device requests keys to their corresponding CAUs 
in their areas. 
2. CAUs send keys and signatures to the devices through 
a secure channel.  
3. When a device wants to join the F2C system, it sends 
the signature to the corresponding CAUs. 
4. Then, the corresponding CAU checks, verifies and 
sends the ACK to the device. 
Actions 1 and 2 in step 2 are been done only the first time a 
device appears in the area. Indeed, if a device leaves the area 
and come back later to that area, the authentication process 
only runs actions 3 and 4 in step 2. 
In the next Section, we describe the test-bed used for validation 
purposes, as well as the results obtained to validate the benefits 
of bringing together the DKMA workflow proposed in this 
paper in the security architecture previously proposed. 
V. RESULTS ANALYSIS 
A. Testbed Description 
The in-lab scenario proposed to validate the DKMA 
workflow emulates a smart city with different devices (see 
Figure 6), such as cars, traffic lights, mobile phones, and so on, 
by deploying a real test-bed with real (Raspberry Pi) and 
virtual devices (Virtual Machines). The current test-bed 
deployment leverages an access point providing connectivity to 
the environment through the same network. Traffic to the cloud 
is sent through the router along the link to cloud. A frontend 
also deploys to manage the test-bed settings as well as to show 
an overview of the different trials running in the test-bed. 
Regarding the network analysis, the test-bed also includes 
some scripts for packets tracking, thus getting updated 
information about the network state using a packet catcher 
(e.g., tcpdump for Linux scenarios) and application logs. 
The experimental environment is deployed the proposed 
DKMA workflow for both the distributed and centralized 
architectures in a Fujitsu Primergy TX300 S8, hosting 100 
virtual devices, and considers a single PC to deploy the 
centralized cloud approach. 
 
Fig. 6. Test-bed scenario 
In the centralized key distribution and authentication 
approach, an additional computer acts as a cloud responsible 
for generating keys and signature, distributing them to 100 
virtual devices and finally authenticating the devices (sequence 
described in Figure 4). In the distributed approach instead, 5 
computers are distributed as CAUs, and an additional computer 
acts as cloud. All CAUs are authenticated in the initialization 
phase, getting the authorization from cloud. Each computer 
serving as CAU groups 20 devices, so there are 5 distributed 
CAUs controlling 20 virtual devices each. Devices get their 
keys and signature and finally authenticate from their 
corresponding control area units (as described in Figure 5).  
B. Comparison  
In this section, we aim at comparing the key distribution 
and authentication processes, as defined in the DKMA 
workflow in both the centralized and distributed architectures. 
To that end and for the sake of comparison, we adapt the 
proposed DKMA workflow to deploy in a centralized 
architecture, as shown in Figure 7 and described next. 
 
Fig. 7. Centralized key distribution and authentication workflow 
Unlike the proposed distributed DKMA strategy the centralized 
approach consists in a unique step, as follows: 
1. A fog device requests keys and signature to be 
authenticated. 
2. The centralized key generation center at cloud 
generates keys and then sends public and private keys 
and signatures to the fog device through a secure 
channel. 
3. Fog devices request authentication by sending their 
signatures 
4. Finally, cloud verifies the signature and sends ACK to 
the devices.  
The key distribution and signature process is done using 
ECDSA, as described in Section 2.  
C. Results Analysis 
We implement the two workflows in Python 3 and show 
the expected benefits for the proposed distributed approach in 
terms of key distribution and authentication delay, network 
delay, and network overhead, on the test-bed described above. 
The obtained results are described next. 
Figure 8 shows the comparison of the two workflows for the 
key distribution and authentication delay. A substantial 
reduction in the delay for the proposed DKMA distributed 
approach is shown. Indeed, while the time grows 
exponentially with the number of devices for the centralized 
approach, it keeps almost flat for the distributed one, reaching 
the maximum reduction when considering 100 devices, from 
28.69s to 1.0942s. 
Similarly, Figure 9 shows the results obtained for the network 
delay, considering both workflows. The network delay is 
computed by dividing the Round Trip Time (RTT) by 2. We 
also show an incremental value for the delay reduction when 
using the distributed approach, reaching just the half (from 
168ms to 84ms), when considering 100 devices. 
Figure 10 shows a comparison of the network overhead for 
both approaches, in a table representing the whole set of 
messages in Kilo-Bytes (KB) forwarded throughout the 
network. We range the number of CAUs depending on the 
number of devices, assuming that, according to a certain 
policy in place, a CAU can manage up to 20 devices. 
Certainly, as shown in Figure 9, while the network overhead 
(KBs) keeps growing for the centralized approach as the 
number of devices increase, it will not change for the proposed 
DKMA distributed approach, as long as we can keep the 
assumed CAUs deployment policy. 
 
Fig. 8. Key distribution and authentication delay comparison. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Network delay comparison. 
 
Fig. 10. Network overhead comparison (Kbytes). 
Finally, we also analyze the total number of messages. To that 
end we only measure the number of messages, thus messages 
size is not considered. The total number of messages per 
device to get keys, signature and finally authenticate according 
both workflows (figure 4 and figure 5) and ECDSA algorithm 
in our implementation is 27 messages. In the first workflow, 
when using cloud as a centralized key distribution and 
authentication approach, the total number of messages goes 
and comes from cloud is (27*number of devices). However, 
when deploying the DKMA distributed controller’s workflow, 
the number of messages is reduced up to (27*number of 
control area units), that is: 
1. Centralized: 27*100=2700 number of messages  
2. Distributed (DKMA): 27*5= 135 number of messages 
As a summary of the obtained and presented results, we 
may assess that the proposed DKMA distributed approach for 
key distribution and authentication is much more efficient than 
a centralized one, while keeping the same security level. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The Fog-to-cloud distributed hierarchical architecture imposes 
the need for a new coordinated security architecture and 
management to handle its distributed nature. In the literature 
we may find proposals using centralized key generator, 
centralized cloud key distribution, centralized trusted authority 
and other centralized tradition key distribution, that can even 
be enriched with replication and cloud elasticity to fix the 
single point of attack. However, despite using replication and 
cloud elasticity, the observed latency when moving to cloud, 
the added complexity and delay required by the key 
management process for thousands of devices, the huge 
amount of messages going to cloud or to the centralized key 
generator, and the whole network delay are all open 
challenges and issues, yet requiring further research efforts. 
This paper proposes a novel distributed key management and 
authentication strategy for F2C systems, referred to as the 
DKMA workflow, turning into significant benefits in terms of 
the time demanded by the key distribution and authentication 
processing, network delay, network overhead, and number of 
messages going to cloud. As a future work we plan to consider 
both hybrid key distribution and authentication to facilitate 
key management, as well as mobility (secure handover). 
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